미국 반도체법 통과(2022.08.01)
2022.08.01
U.S. Passes CHIPS Act, Increasing Restrictions on China Lead to Rising Geopolitical Risk, Says TrendForce
미국, CHIPS법 통과, 중국에 대한 제제 증가로 지정학적 위험 증가.
The disruption of the chip supply chain caused by the pandemic in the past two years, as well as geopolitical flashpoints such as Sino-US trade frictions and the Russia-Ukraine war, have led regional economies worldwide to focus more on the autonomy of local production and supply chains.
지난 2년 동안 팬데믹으로 인한 칩 공급망의 붕괴와 중미 무역 마찰 및 러시아-우크라이나 전쟁과 같은
지정학적 인화점으로 인해 전 세계 지역 경제가 현지 생산의 자율성에 더 집중하게 되었습니다.
According to TrendForce research, in terms of 12-inch equivalent production capacity in various regions around the world, Taiwan will account for approximately 43% of capacity by 2025, followed by China at 27%, the United States at 8%, and South Korea at 12%.
TrendForce 연구에 따르면 전 세계 여러 지역의 12인치 환산 생산 능력면에서, 2025년까지 대만이 약 43%를
차지할 것이며 중국이 27%, 미국이 8%, 한국이 12%를 차지할 것입니다.
In terms of advanced process capacity below 7nm (inclusive), Taiwan will account for approximately 69% by 2025, South Korea 18%, the United States 12%, and China 1%. Compared with the landscape in 2022, it is obvious that the United States will increase its proportion of advanced process production capacity in the next three years,
while China will focus on mature processes.
7nm(포함) 이하의 선단 공정 생산용량은 2025년까지 대만이 약 69%, 한국이 18%, 미국이 12%, 중국이 1%를
차지할 것입니다.
2022년의 전망과 비교할 때 미국은 향후 3년 동안 선단공정 생산 능력의 비율을 증가시키는 반면 ,
중국은 성숙 공정에 집중할 것이 분명합니다.
However, as the U.S. Congress is about to enter its August recess, the Senate and House of Representatives passed "H.R. 4346 The CHIPS (creating helpful incentives to produce semiconductors) and Science Act of 2022" (aka CHIPS Act) promptly last week and the bill officially enters the final leg of the legislative process and will take effect after it is signed by President Biden.
그러나 미 의회가 8월 휴회에 들어가려고 함에 따라, 상원과 하원은 지난주 즉시 'H.R. 법안'과 '2022년 과학법안'을
통과시켰고, 이 법안은 공식적으로 입법 과정의 마지막 단계에 들어가며 바이든 대통령이 서명한 후 발효됩니다.
The draft bill not only covers wafer manufacturing R&D and factory construction subsidies, tax incentives, etc., but also proposes additional restrictions.
법안은 웨이퍼 제조 R&D 및 공장 건설 보조금, 세금 인센티브 등을 포함할 뿐만 아니라
(중국에 대한)추가 제한을 제안하는 것입니다.
It proposes that companies that receive subsidies from the United States be barred from investing in process technologies below 28nm in China during the subsidy period to ensure that the CHIPS Act protects the competitiveness of the U.S. semiconductor industry.
이 법은 미국 반도체 산업의 경쟁력을 보호하기 위해 미국으로부터 보조금을 받는 기업이 보조금 기간 동안
중국에서 28나노 이하 공정 기술 투자를 금지하는 방안을 제안했다.
TrendForce indicates that the only semiconductor companies currently investing in expansion/fabs in the US and China are TSMC and Samsung. It is worth continuing to pay attention to how the U.S. CHIPS Act will restrict the Chinese investment of these two companies.
TrendForce에 따르면 현재 미국과 중국에서 확장/팹에 투자하고 있는 반도체 회사는 TSMC와 삼성뿐입니다.
미국 CHIPS법이 이 두 회사의 중국 투자를 어떻게 제한할지 계속 관심을 기울일 가치가 있습니다.
China earnestly promoting domestic equipment but key equipment for advanced processes is controlled by U.S. allies
중국은 국산 장비 적극 추진하나 선단공정 에 필요한핵심장비는 미국과 동맹들이 장악하고 있다.
Since the U.S. "Entity List" expressly prohibits the sale of U.S. technologies used in advanced processes of 1Xnm and below to enumerated companies, most Chinese foundries have turned to actively expanding mature process technologies of 28nm and above.
미국의 "Entity List"는 1Xnm 이하의 선단 공정에 사용되는 미국 기술을 리스트에 포함된 회사에 판매하는 것을
명시적으로 금지하기 때문에, 대부분의 중국 파운드리는 28nm 이상의 성숙한공정 기술을 적극적으로 확장하는 방향으로 전환했습니다.
At the same time, China is also industriously developing domestic semiconductor equipment in an attempt to achieve a fully U.S.-independent manufacturing line.
동시에 중국도 미국에서 완전히 독립된 생산라인을 구축하기 위해 국내 반도체 장비 개발에 박차를 가하고 있다.
However, TrendForce indicates the U.S.-aligned equipment manufacturers still control certain key semiconductor processing machinery at this stage. U.S.-affiliated equipment is especially crucial in advanced manufacturing processes below 7nm and it is quite difficult to achieve a fully U.S.-independent production line in the short term.
그러나 TrendForce는 미국과 연계된 장비 제조업체가 이 단계에서 여전히 특정 핵심 반도체 공정 기계를
제어하고 있음을 지적합니다. 미국산 장비는 특히 7nm 이하의 첨단 제조공정에서 매우 중요하며
단기간에 완전히 미국에서 독립된 생산라인을 구축하는 것은 상당히 어렵습니다.
It is worth mentioning that SMIC began developing its N+2 (7nm) process technology for DUV exposure
before being placed on the "Entity List" in 2020.
SMIC는 2020년 "Entity List"에 등재되기 전에 DUV 장비로 생산하는 N+2(7nm) 공정 기술을 개발하기 시작했다는 점을
언급할 가치가 있습니다.
R&D was conducted with the machinery purchased at that time and mining-related chips have recently been mass-produced officially. However, according to TrendForce research, since chips below 7nm (inclusive) are approaching their physical limitations, if DUV technology is used in lieu of EUV technology, the chips will require more complicated production procedures, affecting yield and cost performance. In addition, the structure of mining chip is relatively simple compared with other logic chips. TrendForce believes that it may be quite difficult to produce more complex logic chips using this process and the mass production scale of N+2 (7nm) will be extremely limited as long as U.S.-affiliated equipment shipments remain restricted.
In summation, the disruption of the chip supply chain caused by the pandemic has stimulated regional economies to focus more on the issue of semiconductor autonomy. In the context of the Entity List, whose implementation predates the pandemic by several years, the United States not only actively promotes domestic production lines through the CHIPS Act but also proposes additional restrictions to intensify and deepen sanctions against China's semiconductor industry and curbing its development. From the foundry perspective, TSMC and Samsung recently invested in and established factories in the United States to focus on 5nm advanced processes, while most expansion activities in China are in mature processes above 28nm (inclusive).
According to TrendForce data, Chinese foundries are more active in expanding the production capacity of mature processes under the constraints of existing equipment. According to TrendForce, the proportion of 12-inch equivalent production capacity in China will increase from 24% to 27% from 2022 to 2025, the highest growth rate among all regions. However, only accounting for advanced processes (7nm and below), the United States will post the highest growth rate from 2022 to 2025, with its market share expected to grow to 12% by 2025.
The equipment ban has become the biggest variable in Chinese production expansion. The Trump administration previously requested the Netherlands halt its export of machinery to China through the Wassenaar Arrangement, making the export of equipment to China more difficult.
Since SMIC has successfully mass-produced 7nm process products recently, TrendForce believes that the United States may once again use the Arrangement to persuade the Netherlands to expand the scope of restrictions to DUV ArF immersion systems and deepen restrictions on China.
If the U.S. is convincing, a dearth of DUV ArF immersion systems not only affects the feasibility of China developing advanced processes below 7nm (inclusive), since ArF immersion systems are also key in 40/28nm expansion, it may also do a great disserve to the semiconductor expansion plans of China’s primary 40nm and 28nm processes.
